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Hernandez v. Bennett-Haron, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 54 (October 25, 2012)
1
 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - PROVISONS ESTABLISHING CORONER’S INQUEST 
REGARDING OFFICER-INVOLVED DEATHS  
 
Summary 
  
 In an appeal from the district court upholding all but one provision regarding the 
establishment of a coroner’s inquest of officer-involved deaths, the Court determined 
whether Clark County, Nevada, Code of Ordinances (CCCO), Title 2, Chapter 2.12 
violates due process rights and whether the ordinance intrudes upon the Legislature’s 
exclusive authority. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
Provisions requiring a justice of the peace serve as presiding officer in the 
coroner’s inquest proceedings regarding officer-involved deaths intrudes on the 
Legislature’s exclusive authority over the jurisdiction of justices of the peace. The 
offending provision cannot be severed. Such a severance would require the entire inquest 
scheme regarding officer-involved deaths to be struck down because there is no provision 
for anyone other than a justice of the peace to serve as presiding officer in such 
proceedings. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
Nevada Highway Patrol Officers responded to an incident that resulted in a man’s 
death, causing inquest proceedings to begin. However, the Clark County Board of 
Commissioners amended the coroner’s inquest ordinance before the inquest proceedings 
began for the officers. The Nevada Highway Patrol Officers (Appellants) filed separate 
complaints in the district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the 
validity of the amended ordinance based on asserted constitutional violations, which were 
later consolidated. Appellants filed motions and applications for both a temporary 
restraining order and a preliminary injunction against the inquest proceedings. 
 
The district court granted a temporary restraining order, and prohibited the inquest 
proceedings until court ruled on the injunction. The district court entered judgment 
upholding all but one of the Clark County Code sections at issue. The Nevada Highway 
Patrol Officers appealed.  
 
Coroner’s Inquest 
 
The board of county commissioners for any county in Nevada is authorized under 
NRS 244.163 to create a county coroner’s office. Clark County set forth coroner’s duties 
for inquests by enacting the Clark County, Nevada, Code of Ordinances (CCCO), Title 2, 
Chapter 2.12. When an officer-involved death occurs, the coroner calls an inquest and a 
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presiding officer is selected.
2
 An officer-involved death occurs when an officer, while 
acting in his or her official capacity, uses force that may contribute to the death of a 
person. Additionally, an officer-involved death may occur when the officer actively takes 
some role in causing a vehicular accident that leads to a person’s death3 and when 
circumstances support reasonable grounds to suspect the death was unnatural.
4
 The chief 
judge from the township where the death occurred shall appoint a qualified magistrate
5
 as 
the presiding officer.
6
 “The presiding officer shall preside over the inquest and shall 
insure that the inquest is conducted as an investigatory and fact finding proceeding and 
not an adversarial proceeding.”7 
 
Discussion 
 
The Nevada Supreme Court heard the case en banc, and Hardesty wrote the 
opinion. Appellants argue due process rights in the Nevada Constitution will be violated 
if they are forced to participate in the inquest under the current procedures set forth. 
Appellants further contend that the Clark County Board of County Commissioners 
(CCBCC), by designating justices of the peace to perform duties, intrude upon the 
Nevada Constitution’s express delegation of authority to the Legislature to establish the 
jurisdiction of the justices of the peace.  
 
The Court used a de novo standard of review. In the absence of any factual 
dispute, this court reviews a district court’s decision to grant or deny declaratory and 
injunctive relief de novo.
8
 In addition, the Court reviews de novo determinations of 
whether a statute is constitutional.
9
 
 
The Clark County Coroner’s Inquest proceeding does not infringe upon due process 
guarantees 
 
The language is similar between the due process clause contained in the United 
States and Nevada Constitutions,
10
 permitting the court to look to federal precedent for 
guidance in determining violations of the due process clause of the Nevada 
Constitution.
11
 Due process evaluations are done on a case-by-case basis based on the 
facts at issue,
12
 and the level of due process provided depends on the effect the 
proceeding will have on a constitutionally protected interest.
13
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Appellants assert inquest proceedings impliedly put their liberty and property 
interests at stake because the proceedings involve determining the foundation for a 
criminal prosecution. Respondents disagree, stating the reason for the inquest is merely to 
find facts that may subsequently be used in later actions. 
 
Federal Precedent 
 
Three federal court decisions address similar concerns as those raised by the 
appellants. First, in Hannah v. Larche,
14
 the Court held due process rights do not attached 
in the context of an investigatory proceeding. Registrars of voters and private citizens 
were called to appear before a commission investigating alleged voting deprivations in 
Louisiana.
15
 The Court considered the procedures possibly causing irreparable harm to 
those being investigated. These included procedures that subjected them to public 
disgrace or shame, the possibility of losing their jobs, and potential criminal 
prosecution.
16
 The Court determined that “even if such collateral consequences were to 
flow from the Commission’s investigations, they would not be the result of any 
affirmative determinations made by the Commission, and they would not affect the 
legitimacy of the Commission’s investigative function.”17 The Court concluded that due 
process rights were not violated because the commission’s procedures were purely 
investigative and fact-finding.
18
 
 
Second, in Jenkins v. McKeithen,
19
 the Court held due process rights attach in the 
context of an adjudicatory proceeding. The Court applied the test in Hannah to determine 
whether an investigative commission’s procedures violated the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
20
 The commission was to investigate and make findings of fact 
regarding violations or possible violations of criminal laws and to supplement and assist 
the district attorneys and other law enforcement personnel.
21
 The commission was 
required to report any findings and make recommendations for future actions where it 
had probable cause to believe a violation of a criminal law occurred.
22
 The commission 
“very clearly exercises an accusatory function; it is empowered to be used and allegedly 
is used to find named individuals guilty of violating the criminal laws.”23 The Court held 
due process “requires the Commission to afford a person being investigated the right to 
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, subject only to traditional 
limitations on those rights.”24 
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Third, in Aponte v. Calderon,
25
 the First Circuit discussed Hannah and Jenkins in 
determining whether due process rights are implicated in a particular proceeding. A 
commission was created by executive order to address issues related to the use of public 
resources and government corruption, empowered to conduct investigations, make factual 
findings, and issue recommendations against individuals.
26
 However, the commission 
could not initiate or file civil, criminal, or administrative charges or make determinations 
regarding criminal liability or probable cause.
27
 The court concluded that without an 
adjudication of legal rights, due process rights were not triggered and therefore did not 
apply to the commission, even though the possibility existed that the investigations could 
lead to criminal prosecutions.
28
 
 
Clark County Coroner’s Inquest 
 
 In the present case, the provisions fail to provide a clear statement of purpose. The 
Court determined, based on the wording of the provisions,
29
 that the proceedings only 
serve a fact-finding and investigatory function because there is no adjudication or 
determination of any legal rights. 
  
 This makes the inquest proceedings more like the commission in Hannah, being 
purely investigative and fact find. Unlike the statutes in Jenkins, the inquest panel is not 
authorized to make any recommendations to the district attorneys or any other law 
enforcement body,
30
 nor is the resulting interrogatory allowed to address questions of 
fault or guilt.
31
 Thus, under Hannah, Jenkins, and Aponte, the inquest process does not 
trigger due process protections. 
 
Justice of the peace participation in the inquest process violates the Nevada Constitution 
 
The Nevada Constitution expressly provides that only the Legislature has the 
authority to determine the jurisdictional limits of the justices of the peace.
32
 NRS 
259.010(2) plainly provides that in counties with appointed coroners, NRS 259.050 does 
not apply. Reading NRS 250.010(2) and NRS 259.050(4) together, it is clear that justices 
of the peace are only authorized to participate in inquest proceedings in counties where a 
county coroner is not appointed. 
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Clark County has an appointed coroner, and therefore NRS 259.050(4) does not 
apply. Thus, justices of the peace are not authorized to participate in Clark County 
inquest proceedings.
33
 The Court considered whether the non-constitutional portion of the 
code can be severed under the Court test.
34
 However, the code provides no alternative to 
justices of the peace serving as presiding officers. Striking down only CCCO § 
2.12.010(l) would render the entire inquest scheme ineffective because the proceedings 
cannot go forward without a presiding officer. Therefore, the remaining portions, 
standing alone, cannot be given legal effect and, as a result, the entire inquest scheme 
must be struck down. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The provisions setting forth the inquest procedures for officer-involved deaths do 
not implicate appellant’s due process rights. However, as far as the provisions requiring 
the presiding officer be a justice of the peace, these provisions unconstitutionally intrude 
upon the Legislature’s exclusive constitutional authority to determine the jurisdiction of 
justices of the peace. Furthermore, because no exceptions exist to allow anyone other 
than a justice of the peace to serve as presiding officer, the entire inquest scheme for 
officer-involved deaths is unconstitutional. Therefore the Court reverses the district 
court’s decision and vacates the stay of the coroner’s inquest proceedings. 
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